(DOWNLOAD) "Proliferation Politics, and the IAEA" by Aspen Institute ~ Book PDF Kindle ePub Free
eBook details
- Title: Proliferation Politics, and the IAEA
- Author : Aspen Institute
- Release Date : January 01, 1985
- Genre: Politics & Current Events,Books,
- Pages : * pages
- Size : 667 KB
Description
The sense of the meeting was summarized by the Chairman, Abram Chayes, Professor of International Law at the Harvard Law School:
We start, he said, with the premise that non-proliferation is a central element of the effort to avoid a nuclear war.
There is a non-proliferation regime in existence and it has had considerable success. By way of evidence, the Harvard Arms Control Seminar estimated in 1961 that twenty countries could have nuclear weapons by this time. To date, only six countries have weapons or demonstrated the ability to make a nuclear explosive, although one or two others may be in the doubtful category.
That is not a bad record for any international regime, dealing with something as politically sensitive, subject to so many political and emotional interactions as this one.
The IAEA is a part, but only a part, of that regime. Although safeguards perform a valuable function, they can be improved significantly. But, they can never accomplish the entire policing function.
A principal problem is one of unrealistic expectations. The existence of a safeguard system cannot be taken to mean that no further problem exists. The safeguard system is only a partial element of the non-proliferation system.
Assuring the effectiveness and credibility of the safeguard system continues to require U.S. leadership and support. That support and leadership has slipped over the last decade. I think I hear a consensus in this room that it would be very good if that leadership were reinvigorated.
The present mood of the Congress seems to be that full support of IAEA will depend on the continued full participation and membership of Israel. The will of the Congress might be more effectively expressed through a reinvigorated and expanded program of support, than in the context of a shrinking and ungenerous support.
Finally, non-proliferation requires a complex, persistent, and sensitive efforts of U.S. diplomacy in and outside the Agency. And that effort must begin with reinvigorated U.S. leadership in the IAEA.